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O P I N I O N* 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
The District Court granted summary judgment for Appellee American DG Energy 
Inc. (“ADG”) on all of Appellant Michael Safarian’s claims.1  The central issue on appeal 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 Safarian brought claims for violation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(“FLSA”), violation of New Jersey’s Wage and Hour Law, breach of contract, 
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is whether the District Court correctly held that Safarian was an independent contractor, 
and not an employee of ADG.  While we affirm in part, we will also vacate and remand 
in part because the District Court did not reason through the factors that are important for 
determining employment status under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and New 
Jersey state law.   
I.  Background 
ADG operates in the utility business, and Safarian is an engineer who serviced and 
installed ADG’s machines from approximately December 2006 to April 2010.  Safarian 
worked for ADG Mondays through Fridays, as well as some weekends, working at least 
40 hours and sometimes over 50 hours per week.  ADG told him which job site to visit 
and which services to perform.  ADG provided Safarian with materials to install and fix 
its devices, business cards, cellphone, beeper, business email address, and clothes with 
the company logo.  His supervisor described him as ADG’s “boots on the ground” and “a 
face of the company.”  (App. 914, 715.)   
Safarian originally understood that he was “being hired as a full-time employee,” 
but then ADG told him “that it was to the best of the company’s interest to temporarily 
put you on as a subcontractor.”  (App. 814a.)  As a result, Multiservice, a company that 
Safarian owned, invoiced ADG and Multiservice paid Safarian.  Multiservice invoiced 
ADG for Safarian’s time on a per-hour basis.  Safarian occasionally brought an assistant 
                                                                                                                                                 
promissory estoppel, violation of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”), 
and violation of public policy under Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 61 (1980).   
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to the ADG job sites, and Multiservice billed ADG for the assistant’s labor as well.  
Safarian also took a non-ADG job in Russia for two months.   
While working at ADG sites, Safarian discovered that ADG was performing 
certain work without appropriate permits and that ADG was overbilling customers.  
Safarian objected to ADG’s permit violations and overbilling practices.  Safarian claims 
that ADG terminated him in retaliation for these disclosures. 
The District Court noted that in order to bring claims under the federal statute, the 
FLSA, or New Jersey state laws, namely the CEPA, Pierce, and the New Jersey Wage 
and Hour Law, Safarian must be an employee of ADG.  The District Court stated that 
determining whether Safarian was an employee required an examination of all the 
circumstances, and it cited factors that we have listed as determinative in FLSA cases, 
citing Martin v. Selker Bros., 949 F.2d 1286 (3d Cir. 1991).  The District Court then 
noted that some of the facts of Safarian’s relationship with ADG were “often associated 
with employee relationships,” such as the continuity of the relationship, the importance of 
Safarian’s work to the business, payment on a per-hour basis, and the provision of 
uniforms, tools, and a phone.  (App. 9.)  The District Court concluded, however, that 
Safarian was an independent contractor because he “structured his relationship with 
[ADG] as an independent contractor and gained certain benefits that come with this 
status.”  (Id.)  “After experiencing the benefits available through this arrangement, 
[Safarian] ‘stumbles’ in an effort to characterize himself as an employee of [ADG].”  
(Id.)   
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II.  Analysis 
Safarian’s “employment status . . . is a legal conclusion,” and “[t]hus, our standard 
of review of the legal determination of employee status is plenary.”  Martin, 949 F.2d at 
1292.2 
Under the FLSA, “the term ‘employee’ means any individual employed by an 
employer.”  29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1).  This statutory definition is “necessarily broad to 
effectuate the remedial purposes of the Act.”  Martin, 949 F.2d at 1293.  In accordance 
with this “expansive definition[],” courts must “look to the economic realities of the 
relationship in determining employee status under the FLSA.”  Id.; see also Tony & 
Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 (1985) (“The test of 
employment under the Act is one of ‘economic reality’ . . . .”) (quoting Goldberg v. 
Whitaker House Co-op., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961)).  There are six factors to determine 
whether a worker is an “employee” under the FLSA: 
1) the degree of the alleged employer’s right to control the manner in which 
the work is to be performed; 2) the alleged employee’s opportunity for 
profit or loss depending upon his managerial skill; 3) the alleged 
employee’s investment in equipment or materials required for his task, or 
his employment of helpers; 4) whether the service rendered requires a 
special skill; 5) the degree of permanence of the working relationship; 6) 
whether the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer’s 
business. 
 
Martin, 949 F.2d at 1293 (quoting Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 
1376, 1382 (3d Cir. 1985)).  
                                              
2 In general, “we employ a plenary standard in reviewing orders entered on motions for 




 Even though the District Court listed these factors, it did not reason through 
them.  Instead, it focused on the structure of the Safarian-ADG relationship, 
noting, for example, that Safarian billed his work for ADG through Multiservice 
and that Safarian used Multiservice to claim tax advantages.  However, it is the 
economic realities of the relationship as analyzed using the Martin factors, not the 
structure of the relationship, that is determinative.  Indeed, the issue arises because 
the parties structured the relationship as an independent contractor, but the caselaw 
counsels that, for purposes of the worker’s rights under the FLSA, we must look 
beyond the structure to the economic realities.  Thus, the dissent’s concern with 
the structure is beside the point.3   
 In Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 726 (1947), the 
Supreme Court held that meat boners in a factory were employees, even though 
the boners owned their own tools, hired employees to assist with the boning 
operation, and were not paid hourly.  The Rutherford court noted that “[w]hile 
profits to the boners depended upon the efficiency of their work, it was more like 
piecework than an enterprise that actually depended for success upon the initiative, 
judgment or foresight of the typical independent contractor.”  Id. at 730.   In Tony 
and Susan Alamo Foundation, the Supreme Court held that workers—who 
testified that they were not employees, did not work for material rewards, and 
volunteered for ministry purposes—were employees within the meaning of the 
                                              
3 Moreover, I view the analysis of the Martin factors as pointing more toward employee 
status for Safarian than our dissenting colleague; but it will be for the District Court to 
address these factors in the first instance. 
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FLSA because they were “entirely dependent upon the Foundation for long 
periods, in some cases several years.”  Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 
301 (quoting Donovan v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 567 F. Supp. 556, 562 
(W.D. Ark. 1982)).   See also Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 
1385-86 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that workers were employees under the FLSA 
because they “were not in a position to offer their services to many different 
businesses and organizations,” “worked on a continuous basis with DialAmerica 
and were able to work only when and if DialAmerica was in need of their 
services,” and, consequently, “were economically dependent on DialAmerica”); 
Robicheaux v. Radcliff Material, Inc., 697 F.2d 662, 667 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding 
that workers were employees because “the fact that [workers] provided their own 
insurance coverage, listed themselves as self-employed on their tax returns, and 
had their own business cards and letterheads, does not tip the balance in favor of 
independent contractor status where, as here, the economic realities of the 
situation indicate that the employee depended upon the employer for his 
livelihood”); Scantland v. Jeffry Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 
2013) (“This [FLSA] inquiry is not governed by the ‘label’ put on the relationship 
by the parties or the contract controlling that relationship, but rather focuses on 
whether ‘the work done, in its essence, follows the usual path of an employee.’”) 
(quoting Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 729).   
 The fundamental point here is that courts must look to the economic 
realities, not the structure, of the relationship between the workers and the 
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businesses.  Accordingly, we will vacate and remand so that the District Court can 
apply the proper test by examining the facts in light of the Martin factors and 
weighing them in coming to a conclusion regarding Safarian’s employee status.  
We will also vacate the District Court’s grant of summary judgment under CEPA 
and Pierce because the District Court did not consider the factors under New 
Jersey law for determining whether Safarian was an employee under those laws.  
See Pukowsky v. Caruso, 711 A.2d 398, 404 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) 
(listing 12 factors that courts should consider to determine a worker’s status).   
 However, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in 
favor of ADG on Safarian’s Dodd-Frank,4 breach of contract, New Jersey Wage 
and Hour Law, and promissory estoppel claims.  We will also affirm the 
Magistrate Judge’s decisions regarding discovery.  “[W]e review a district court’s 
denial of a discovery motion for an abuse of discretion,” and there was no abuse of 
discretion here.  Lloyd v. HOVENSA, LLC., 369 F.3d 263, 274 (3d Cir. 2004). 
III. Conclusion 
Accordingly, we will affirm in part and vacate in part.  We will affirm the District 
Court’s rulings on the Dodd-Frank, New Jersey Wage and Hour Law, promissory 
                                              
4 In order to receive Dodd-Frank whistleblower protection, an employee must report 
“conduct which the employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of section 1341, 
1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 1514A(a)(1).  The District Court correctly determined that the misconduct that Safarian 
reported did not fall into any of these categories.  Amicus Department of Labor expressed 
concern that the District Court’s opinion could be read narrowly to imply that Dodd-
Frank whistleblower protection only applies to lawyers, accountants, or auditors who 
report shareholder fraud.  We do not read the District Court opinion so narrowly. 
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estoppel, and breach of contract claims and its discovery orders.  We will vacate the entry 
of summary judgment on Safarian’s FLSA, CEPA, and Pierce claims, and remand for 
further proceedings. 
Mikael M. Safarian v. American DG Energy Inc. v. Multiservice Power, Inc. 
No. 14-2734 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part. 
I join the panel’s opinion except that I disagree with my colleagues’ decision to 
vacate and remand for a redetermination of Safarian’s employment status under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act. In my view, the record supports the District Court’s conclusion that 
Safarian is not an employee of American DG Energy Inc. (ADG) for purposes of federal 
law. 
 In the seminal case of Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, the Supreme Court 
explained that “the determination of the [employment] relationship does not depend on 
. . . isolated factors but rather upon the circumstances of the whole activity.” 331 U.S. 
722, 730 (1947). To help courts in making the employment-status determination, we 
enunciated six factors: 
1) the degree of the alleged employer’s right to control the manner in which 
the work is to be performed; 2) the alleged employee’s opportunity for 
profit or loss depending upon his managerial skill; 3) the alleged 
employee’s investment in equipment or materials required for his task, or 
his employment of helpers; 4) whether the service rendered requires a 
special skill; 5) the degree of permanence of the working relationship; 6) 
whether the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer’s 
business.  
Martin v. Selker Bros., 949 F.2d 1286, 1293 (3d Cir. 1991). After articulating these six 
factors, we explained that “[t]here is no single test to determine whether a person is an 
employee or an independent contractor for purposes of the FLSA.” Id. We further 




Here, the District Court noted many of the facts germane to the Martin factors in 
the background section of its opinion. For example, the District Court noted that Safarian 
is an engineer who worked for ADG five days a week for over three years and was told by 
ADG where to go and what services to perform. The Court also indicated that Safarian 
was supplied materials by ADG and was paid by ADG through Multiservice Power, 
Inc.—a company Safarian owned. See Safarian v. Am. DG Energy Inc., 2014 WL 
1744989, at *1 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2014). The Court then observed several key facts about 
Multiservice, namely, that it billed ADG by invoice, had its own insurance, hired its own 
accountant, filed payroll taxes for Safarian, owned its own company vehicle (that Safarian 
used), and took advantage of various small business benefits. Id. Finally the Court 
discussed some statements Safarian made concerning his employment status in response 
to a tax issue and two offers of employment from ADG. Id. 
In its analysis section, the District Court began by rightly noting that the totality of 
the circumstances and the Martin factors determine whether a worker is an employee or 
an independent contractor. Id. at *2–*3. Though the Court acknowledged that some facts 
favor each side, it found that Safarian benefitted from the structure of his relationship 
with ADG—by, for example, claiming certain deductions on Multiservice’s taxes—and 
thus was an independent contractor. 
According to the majority, the Court’s analysis was overly formalistic. I disagree. 
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Seven decades of precedent emphasize a flexible, totality-of-the-circumstances 
employment-status inquiry; or, in other words, exactly the type of analysis conducted by 
the District Court. 
The majority’s principal criticism of the District Court is that it didn’t rely on the 
Martin factors. As noted above and further explained below, I don’t think it’s necessary 
for a court to organize its analysis according to the Martin factors. But even if such 
organization were required, the District Court’s opinion passes muster for the reasons that 
follow. 
1. Control 
The District Court touched on this factor when it noted that Safarian is an engineer 
and that ADG told Safarian where to go and what services to perform. Safarian’s 
technical expertise meant that he had a certain amount of discretion, even though ultimate 
decisions concerning his work were made by supervisors at ADG. 
2. Opportunity for Profit or Loss 
The second factor weighs in favor of Safarian because, as noted by the District 
Court, he was paid (through invoices to Multiservice) on an hourly basis rather than by 
each project he worked on. 
3. Investment in Equipment and Helpers 
This factor cuts in ADG’s favor because Multiservice owned various pieces of 
equipment that Safarian sometimes used when working for ADG, and Safarian then 
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claimed deductions on Multiservice’s taxes for depreciation of that equipment. Though 
not mentioned by the District Court, it is undisputed that Safarian occasionally brought 
his nephew to ADG jobs as a helper and then billed ADG (through Multiservice) for his 
nephew’s work. App. 291, 302, 351–55. 
4. Special Skill 
Engineering is a profession that requires special skills, as indicated by Safarian’s 
undergraduate degree in nuclear science and nuclear engineering and his professional 
license to work on gas turbine engines of unlimited horsepower. App. 283–84. Though 
the District Court only mentioned that Safarian was an engineer, it was sufficient 
shorthand for conveying the fact that he had special skills, especially when noted in 
conjunction with his work installing and servicing complex cogeneration systems. 
5. Permanence  
The District Court observed that Safarian worked for ADG for over three years. 
6. Integral to Business  
Finally, the District Court noted that ADG is in the utility business and that 
Safarian serviced and installed ADG’s systems. Though the District Court could have 
described in more detail how Safarian’s work was integral to ADG, that would have been 
unnecessary (as indicated by ADG conceding this factor on appeal). 
While the District Court elucidated facts supporting an analysis under the Martin 
test, it candidly stated that “the question of employment status is far from 
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straightforward,” Safarian, 2014 WL 1744989, at *3, and then discussed facts that don’t 
neatly conform to Martin’s analytical framework. In my view, two facts make this case 
exceptional enough to justify departing from a rigid application of the Martin factors in 
order to better reflect the economic realities of the relationship. 
First, Safarian’s employment by Multiservice while performing work for ADG is 
unique.1 In fact, neither Safarian nor the majority can point to a single decision where a 
court said that the business organization of an alleged employee is irrelevant in 
determining employment status under the FLSA. There was thus nothing improper about 
the District Court looking to the benefits Safarian received by performing work for ADG 
through Multiservice—all the District Court did was force Safarian to “take the bitter 
with the sweet.” Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 154 (1974) (plurality opinion). The 
Tenth Circuit when confronted with a similar situation adhered to a common sense 
analysis that is more faithful to Supreme Court precedent than the majority’s approach 
here. See Barlow v. C.R. England, Inc., 703 F.3d 497, 506 (10th Cir. 2012) (considering 
the implications of a worker performing services for the alleged employer through a 
company that the worker owned). The Supreme Court has also indicated that this 
consideration is legitimate. See Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 730 (“The group had no business 
organization that could or did shift as a unit from one slaughter-house to another.”).  
                                                 
1 The District Court expressly discussed the benefits Safarian obtained from 
working for ADG through Multiservice, noting, for example, that Multiservice claimed 
certain tax deductions. 
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The second unique feature of this case is that Safarian is an educated professional 
who was highly compensated—to the tune of almost $600,000 during his three-plus years 
with ADG. If the central concern of the FLSA is preventing employers from taking 
advantage of a monopsony, see Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1542 (7th Cir. 
1987) (Easterbrook, J., concurring), then applying its protections to Safarian would be 
anomalous to say the least. Moreover, while performing work for ADG, Safarian turned 
down an employment offer that apparently would have paid well into the six figures. 
For the reasons stated, I join the panel’s opinion in all respects except that I would 
affirm the judgment of the District Court on Safarian’s FLSA claim. 
